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THE NEED FOR A FUNCTIONALIST
JURISPRUDENCE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
IN AFRICA
M. Mwalimu,S.J.D.*
The connection between law and society in nations all over the world
is not only complex but is also in a constant flux, evolving intricately
and almost perpetually as societies advance to idealized forms of govern-
ment. In the context of development, the function of law that stands out
most clearly is its deployment as a conscious instrument of social engi-
neering, i.e. affecting the behaviour of individuals and groups toward
planned social, economic and legal ends. It is ultimately to the law that
governments are most likely to resort in the creation of institutions needed
for development. Law is utilised either to lead or to follow the chosen
developmental paths. While sociologists and legal theorists recognise the
complex interplay between legal and social issues, differences continue to
exist over how, in what manner and to what extent the interplay should
be assessed when studying the role of law in the development of societies.
Over the centuries, different jurists have postulated varied explanations
for the existence of law and its relationship to the societies the law seeks
to govern. From 19th century analytical positivists' theories of law being
a command of the sovereign habitually obeyed by the rulers, to legal
realist, sociological and economic theories of law that advocate the study
of law in relation to facets of social behaviour itself, these "Western"
theories of law have, like the inherited legal systems from African metro-
poles, been transplanted and integrated in the legal culture of African
nations. Jurisprudence, as a course taught to advanced law students in
African law schools, largely involves the study of the Western philosophers
such as John Austin, Hans Kelsen, Fredrich Karl, von Savigny, Karl
Llewellyn, Karl Marx, Roscoe Pound, Benjamin Cardozo and others,
philosophers who no doubt contributed immensely to the understanding
of law as it operated in the specific societies the philosophers studied.
* LL.B., University of Zambia; LL.M., University of Zambia; LL.M., Georgetown University
Law Center; S.J.D., Georgetown University Law Center.
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The standard texts used in teaching jurisprudence are practically the same
as those prescribed by law schools in the Western nations such as the
United States or the United Kingdom. However, the use of this teaching
material identical to that used in Western Schools is not only inappropriate
for the understanding of the true state of law in developing nations but
also contributes to the lack of development of a form of jurisprudential
thought that should be indigenously developed for the understanding of
a uniquely pluralistic society.'
Recognition of the primary role of law in shaping the development of
African nations makes it imperative that studies on the nature and role
of law be undertaken and understood from an African rather than a
Western perspective. The law should be responsive to the actual social
needs of each particular society. This is not to deny any role to the
Western philosophical studies in understanding and teaching about law in
Africa, as there is undoubtedly invaluable assistance in learning and
making comparisons with other approaches and techniques in understand-
ing law. However, there exists a paramount need for developing an African
jurisprudence that is suitable for the unique African developmental situ-
ation, This need is based on two main factors: the unique socio-legal
background of developing African nations and the call for a responsive
legal system with more of a functional character than of an analytical
nature.2
In many present day English speaking African nations, two sets of
laws govern the relationships of society members. There is the modern
statutory law by which all society members are governed and there is the
unwritten customary law that governs the relationships of persons opting
to live under traditional patterns of behaviour. The latter is largely in
personal law matters such as marriage, divorce and inheritance. In coun-
tries such as Nigeria, Ghana and Zambia the application of customary
laws together with the written statutory laws is specifically provided for
in local legislation, following the inherited British-devised "repugnancy
tests." These tests require courts that are conferred with the jurisdiction
to apply the customary laws to follow such laws only insofar as they are
1. See Hiller, Reconstructing Law Teaching Programmes in Developing African Countries, II
E. AFR. L.J. 69-79 (1975) and Teaching Jurisprudence in East Africa, 10 FOREIGN EXCHANGE BULL.,
No. 2, 1969, at 3. See also ESSAYS ON THIRD WORLD PERSPECTIVES IN JURISPRUDENCE (M. Marasinghe
and W. Conklin eds.) (1984).
2. While the role of analytical positivist theories of law is useful in the explanation and
understanding of the coercive element in law, it is the functional nature and role of law that needs
to be emphasized in postulating jurisprudential thought in developing nations.
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not contrary to standards such as equity, good conscience, morality,
principles of natural justice and are not contrary to the written laws of
a country.' The existence of this duality of laws in the English speaking
African nations requires that judges apply the customary laws on a case-
by-case basis. The selective application of these laws with the recognised
supremacy of the written statutory laws makes it imperative that judicial
discretion in the definition and creation of the true state of the customary
law be wide in order to provide flexibility in judicial reasoning. The laws
that the judges define attempt a harmonisation of traditional customary
laws and the "modern" statutory laws. Consequently, this body of law
should be studied as a social phenomenon, part of the entire social
process. It cannot be described in analytical terms as commands of the
sovereign, for customary laws are true reflections of popular social
practices. While the administration of customary laws is subjected to tests
determined by the ruling sovereign, the fact that the laws emanate from
society and not from a sovereign make the laws spontaneous and therefore
readily assimilated in the societies.
Besides this unique plurality of legal culture, a second argument for
teaching and advocating a unique African jurisprudence rests on the
demanding role that law has in vastly and radically altering socio-legal
institutions in developing societies. The fast pace of urbanisation and the
changes in social codes of behaviour require that laws that are authori-
tatively promulgated be readily deployed to bring about the desired
changes. The ability of a legal system to integrate the changes in a
democratic manner often determines whether the system is in harmony
with the desired expectations of the majority rather than those of the
selected leaders and powerful elites.
Different jurists have emphasized a variety of social factors in defining
law and its role in society. Some writers have urged the integration of
conflicting societal interests through law, whereas others identify the
differentiation of class interests as the key to identifying the actual state
of the law. The postulation of an African jurisprudence has to integrate
law as part of the social institution since law is, after all, meant to serve
society's needs. The success of law in achieving its intended objectives
often depends on the popular support of the changes brought about by
3. See, for example, 12 of the Local Courts Act of Zambia, Ch. 54 of the Laws of Zambia.
This section stipulates that the law to be applied by the local courts is customary law that is not
incompatible with the provisions of written law and if it is not repugnant to natural justice or
morality.
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the law. As is often said, the law on paper has to accord with the law in
action in order to reflect the actual, accepted social practices. The para-
mount goal of law should be purposeful and, if this goal is to be realised
through democratic means, societal input in the formulation, execution
and adjudication of laws is of utmost importance. Laws that are enacted
with democratic participation have greater chances of being readily assim-
ilated and accepted by the societies that the laws seek to govern.
With this postulated background, it is necessary to outline briefly the
appropriate form of jurisprudence that is suited to the needs of developing
African societies. This form of jurisprudence integrates the philosophical
theories of jurists who have posited functionalist jurisprudence in the
exposition and analysis of law in society.
Numerous jurists have in recent years emphasized the need to adopt
social science methodologies in ascertaining the relationship between law
and society in order to make law achieve its ends in society. Economic
theorists argue, for instance, that law is a product of existing economic
forces and consequently that law is a tool used by the ruling class to
maintain control over the ruled class. Such theories of law, based on Karl
Marx's and Frederick Engels' writings 4 are popular among the "radicals"
of new states who view the creation of a small rich class and a large poor
class in developing societies as a direct result of the laissez faire system
of government and the dominant, almost repressive, role of law and legal
institutions in society. In many developing societies of Africa, conflicting
interests created by the existing subsistence, peasant, worker and elite
classes have eroded the traditional communalistic way of living wherein
common societal concerns and interests overrode individualism. Further,
in order to preserve the status quo, the rulers of many new states are
seen by the radicals to hold on to power using the legal machinery to
suit their own needs. This belief is often based on the unchanging
leadership in African nations that is constitutionally sanctioned with
supremacy of political parties over government institutions.'
Several examples of the above may be given. It is argued by Richard
Quinney, for instance, that in capitalist societies, law recognises and
perpetuates the powerful social and economic interests of the ruling class
4. See K. MARX, A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (N. Stone trans.
1904); see also F. ENGELS, LUDWIG FEUERBACH AND THE OUTCOME OF CLASSICAL GERMAN PHILOSOPHY
(1934).
5. Malawi, for instance, has only one "life" presidency, held by Dr. Kamuzu Banda since
the nation attained independence in 1964. Zambia too has had only one president since 1964. Both
of these nations are under one-party rule, the former since 1966 and the latter since 1972.
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and that criminal laws are consistently used to preserve domestic tran-
quility.6 Robert Seidman and William Chambliss have also pointed out
that among the conflicting societal interests that necessitate law, it is often
the interests of important groups that determine the content of legislation.'
Chambliss urges the utilisation of the logic or Marxian theory to an
understanding of the nature of crime and criminal law.' He posits the
theory that the economic interests and political power of the social class
which controls the means of production defines the content of criminal
law and that crime is by its very nature a socio-political matter. This is
so, he says, because it is in the enforcement of law that the lower classes
are subject to the effects of the ruling class domination over the legal
system which appears to show a concentration of criminal acts among the
lower classes, whereas, in actual practice, class differences in rates of
criminal activity are probably negligible. Chambliss concludes that law
enforcement systems are not organised to reduce crime or to enforce the
public morality. Rather, they are organised to manage crime by cooper-
ating with most criminal groups and enforcing laws against those whose
crimes are minimal.
It must be conceded that some laws in society do reflect the desires
of special interest groups such as some laws of contract enacted under
the lobbying pressures of large corporations, as has actually been verified
by some writers. 9 This does work to the disadvantage of groups without
such political and material powers of persuasion, and certainly there exist
some politically motivated laws in developing societies that seek to outlaw
political opposition. However, not all laws can be categorised as being
reflective of class interests. Many laws such as the laws of tort, laws of
marriage, laws of evidence, laws of labor relations or even many aspects
of criminal laws such as theft, homicide or rape are based on the necessity
of ordering social relations in a manner that is widely acceptable to the
majority in society. The majority's perception of what is morally right or
wrong or what is reflective of actual needs in organising social behaviour
accounts for the varied nature of laws in a particular society. It may be
the case that in the enforcement of these laws the rich would have an
advantage in securing better legal representation or even the ability to
6. R. QUINNEY, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA (1974).
7. W. CHAMBLISS & R. SEIDMAN, LAW, ORDER AND POWER (1971).
8. C. Reasons & R. Rich, Sociology of Law, A Conflict Perspective 191-211, in TOWARD A
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CRIME (1978).
9. See e.g., Graham, Profits at all Costs. Amphetamine Profits on Capital Hill, TRANSACTION,
Jan. 1972, at 14.
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deploy devious and illegal means to "buy" their way out of infractions
of the law, but this does not make the laws any different; they are the
same laws but enforced selectively. In each society, the proper enforcement
of law and order depends on the honesty, integrity and impartiality of
the law enforcement agencies. It would therefore be inappropriate to study
law simply from a conflict perspective. Not all laws are the result of class
position or class supremacy.
In contrast to economic theories of law as an instrument of domination
in society, sociological jurists such as Rudolf Von Jhering, Leon Duguit
and Eugen Ehrlich emphasize the need for a purposeful study of law that
strives at a harmonisation of individual interests and general societal
interests.' 0 Such sociologists argue that no true study of law can be made
without an understanding of the social milieu which the law governs and
further, that to be binding, efficacious and respected, law has to be
dictated by the social life of the community. Where change is needed but
society itself has not considered or demanded it, then the role of legislation
in changing social norms should be conceded.
This functional study of law in terms of its purpose or ends, started
by Jhering's theory of harmonising individual and social interests, was
elaborated further in Roscoe Pound's analysis of the function of law in
maintaining social order and in effectuating social change." Pound, who
is considered to be the founder of American sociological jurisprudence,
postulated the end of law as the satisfaction of different societal interests.
These interests he categorised into (1) individual interests that involved
immediate individual claims and demands,(2) public interests that con-
cerned the claims, demands and desires of politically organised societies
asserted through organisations, and (3) social interests that involved claims,
demands or desires in the social life of civilised societies. 2 For Pound,
the task of law is to achieve a balance and harmony among all of these
interests and to recognise which interests are paramount at a specific time
period. Pound was content to think of law as a social institution whose
role is to satisfy social wants and that the claims, demands and expecta-
tions of civilised society ought to be satisfied as fully as possible without
sacrificing basic principles of obligation and coexistence. Thus Pound
writes,
10. R. JHERING, LAW As A MEANS TO AN END (1. Husik trans. 1924). See also E. EHRLICH,
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (W. Moll trans. 1936).
11. R. POUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1954).
12. Pound, A Theory of Social Interests, 15 PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMER. SOC. SoC'Y
16 (1921); see also, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1943).
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I am content to see in legal history the record of a continually wider
recognising and satisfying of human wants or claims or desires through
social control; a more embracing and more effective elimination of
waste and precluding of friction in human enjoyment of the goods in
existence, in short, a continually more efficacious social engineering. 3
Pound's theory of social engineering, i.e. ordering human relations
through the action of a politically organised society, has contributed
immensely to the development of a sociological jurisprudence. In many
developing societies of Africa such as Zambia, there are many classes of
individual and social interests due to the country's diverse ethnicity.
Coexistence among individual citizens, foreigners (former colonial offi-
cials, businessmen and other individuals), tribal and other groups of
people creates a variety of demands on the legal system. Often, the
interests of these individuals and groups are conflicting and it is only
through law that social compromises can be made. In such an enviroment,
the task of law is certainly that of social engineering. Pound's functional
approach in studying law is thus of great appeal because it does not study
law from an aloof position as do the analytical positivists. Law should
be studied and taught as a social phenomenon in the context of the total
social process. Inquiry should be made as to what is expected of it, what
it can do for society and how best it can be utilised for the attainment
of a government's stated goals. As Llewellyn and Hoebel have argued,
law should be looked at as a tool of getting jobs done in a particular
culture. 14 The manner in which such a tool is employed in fulfilling its
functions and achieving its ends will account for the success or failure of
such employment. The ability and recognition of the influence of formal
law in reforming and influencing the practices of old and primitive societies
to become modern and futuristic ones is necessary in any analysis of a
functional nature. The manner in which such a reformation is accom-
plished is crucial to the popularity of the resulting laws, particularly in
vastly pluralistic societies in Africa. In the law making process, legislators
should seek to involve wide societal participation through duly and dem-
ocratically elected representatives. In the executive process, administration
should be fair and just. In judicial reasoning the goal of impartial
administration of justice, even in single party regimes, should be para-
mount.
13. INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 11, at 47.
14. K. LLEWELLYN & E. HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE
JURISPRUDENCE (1941).
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Other sociological theories that have emphasized an important aspect
of social life in analysing the concept of law, are the legal realist theories
that assert the paramouncy of judicial law-making in understanding the
true nature of law. 5 The writings of legal realists such as Oliver Wendell
Holmes, John Chipman Gray 6 and Karl Llewellyn' 7 call for a pragmatic
approach to the study of law which is the law in action in society rather
than the law on paper. Legal realism is based on the premise that law
cannot be understood without reference to the realities of human social
life and one of the realities is that it is judges conversant with historical,
economic and social aspects of life who define the true state of the law.
The task of judges is not only to discover the law, but also to formulate
it through the exercise of discretion as to principle or policy issues before
the court. Actual decisions rendered are based on a particular judge's
views of justice, conditioned in part by his personality, background and
the values that he holds which then are rationalised into judicial decisions.
Such realism is often urged to be a practical assessment of law in Africa
since it is argued that judges appointed to the Supreme Courts by the
leaders of One Party States more often than not will decide issues and
the actual interpretation of law on political exigencies. It is argued, for
instance, that in many politically sensitive cases, judges will bend the laws
to decide cases in favour of the political climate.'" Such decisions are
rationalised as being based on the broad policy decisions of the ruling
government. Thus, the argument made is that the true state of law in
developing societies is what the judges decide in their adjudicative process.
Another approach to the study of law suggested by Llewellyn and
Hoebel is that of viewing law as a tool measured against a body of stated
objectives and problems not posed by it, but given to it for solution. 9
Thus, the authors urge that maximum utility of law would be achieved
by use of techniques or processes that would assure the harmonious
coexistence of old customary laws and new statutory ones. This would be
done through the juristic method that sets out the jobs that need to be
done through law and through the utilisation of both personal and
traditional ways of attaining justice. The emphasis Llewellyn and Hoebel
place on utilising past culture in understanding and improving the present
15. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1923).
16. J.C. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW (1931).
17. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1930); see also JURISPRUDENCE (1962).
18. See, for instance, the arguments made by Picho Ali, Ideological Commitment and the
Judiciary, TRANSITION No. 36, July 1968.
19. See supra note 14.
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cultures is particularly apt for the circumstances of developing nations in
Africa. The communalistic nature of many African groups that is espoused
in the ideological beliefs of Humanism or Socialism calls for an integration
of traditional customary beliefs and practices with the modern ways of
living brought about by rapid urbanisation. Individual needs are urged to
be less important than the general societal needs in order to restore
humanity and justice in society.
Traditional jurisprudence is therefore limited as a legal science due to
its allegiance to the state and law theory and due to its lack of analysis
into the social elements that interconnect with law in a variety of ways.
As has been noted by Adam Podgorecki, 20 legal theory should strive to
ascertain both the conditions wherein law works most efficiently and the
means whereby existing laws interact with social and economic factors.
Analysis of law based on sociological inquiries into legal, moral, economic,
cultural and other social norms provides a richer data base that may be
used to ascertain the best means of attaining the objectives of the law.
While it should be conceded that the element of coercion postulated in
analytical positivism is necessary in the enforcement of law and in the
authoritative promulgation of the laws, the aspect of coercion is and
should be sanctioned by society itself through democratically elected
leadership. Coercion should not emanate from the rulers' own volition.
Writers such as Donald Black advocate a "pure" sociology of law
that excludes evaluative elements and legal policy matters that cannot be
verified. 21 Black urges that law should consist of observable acts for the
sociologist to investigate empirically. He argues that where an ideal with
no empirical referent is used to compare with legal reality, the personal
ideals of the researcher may be equated with society's legal ideals, bringing
in elements of advocacy rather than empirical investigations. Further, he
argues, a pure sociological approach to law should involve a scientific
analysis of legal life as a system of behaviour rather than an assessment
of legal policy because the latter involves value-added policy analyses
which are irrelevant to a pure sociology of law. Such a pure sociological
perspective is, however, inappropriate for modern studies of law because
it ignores problems, values and doctrines of jurisprudence, together with
the rules, principles and policies that are integral in constituting law. The
purpose of social inquiry should be to ascertain both empirical and value
analyses that have to be understood and integrated to ensure the greatest
20. A. PODGORECKI, LAW AND SOCIETY (1974).
21. D. BLACK, THE BEHAVIOUR OF LAW (1976).
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utility of law. It is therefore this wider approach rather than the narrow
"pure" sociology that should be adopted in the teaching and study of
law in developing nations of Africa.
In contrast to Black's scientific approach to the study of law, Nonet
and Selznick propose a re-integration of legal, political and social theories
in jurisprudential studies.22 These writers argue tfiat each society's legal
and social experiences are variable and contextual, that a legal order has
many dimensions and that inquiry is best served when those dimensions
are treated as variables. They advocate that the extent to which and the
conditions in which the connections between law and social norms occur
should be analysed to determine the true nature of law in society. Nonet
and Selznick posit three types of law: repressive law, autonomous law
and responsive law. A repressive legal system is based on the positivist
attributes such as the subordination of law to power politics, it seeks to
attain order rather than acceptance and has rules that are crude and
detailed but only weakly bind the rule makers. An autonomous law, on
the other hand, seeks legitimation, weakly binds the rulers and ruled and
theoretically assures the independence of politics and law. A responsive
law aims to achieve competence, seeks substantive justice, rests on a
morality of cooperation and integrates legal and political aspirations with
a blending of powers.
In the repressive law model, law is the command of the sovereign,
who possesses, in principle, unlimited discretion. In this legal system, the
state and law are inseparable. The conflict-based theories postulated by
writers such as Karl Marx are based on the categorisation of law as being
repressive. Arguments of social defence, national security and national
unity are used to justify unconditional obedience. Criticism is branded as
disloyalty. It is argued that in African One Party States, authoritarian
tendencies continue to perpetuate one party rule wherein law and politics
are integrated, with politics often overriding in cases of conflict.2 3 By
analysing a legal system from a bureaucratic perspective (such as the
manner in which the institution is organised with reference to its purpose,
authority, the nature of its rules, its decision making process and its
career objectives, an assessment can be made as to the capacities and
weaknesses of the institutions and their potential for the realisation of
goals. The bureaucracy of a responsive legal system would rest on attrib-
22. P. NONET & P. SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION - TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW
(1978).
23. See e.g., G.M. CARTER, AFRICAN ONE PARTY STATES (1962).
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utes such as clearly identifiable purposes, hierarchically divided spheres
of competence, codified rules for administrative regularity, systematic
decision making processes with limited delegatory and discretionary powers
and would be led by qualified and committed leaders who are appointed
on merit rather than political affiliation or personal favours. The bureau-
cracy of a repressive legal system, on the other hand, rests on unsystematic
rules, ad hoc decision making, and a confusion of private interests and
public responsibilities. It is led by persons who are not qualified because
their positions of authority are awarded as rewards for favours done to
and for the leaders. This kind of bureaucracy has a precarious legitimacy
and its capacity for achieving any developmental changes is very weak as
it does not rest on popular support. The transition of a legal system from
an ad hoc pre-bureaucratic nature to a stable bureaucratic one often
depends on the ability and willingness of the leaders of a nation to change
the existing status quo by radically transforming not only the nature of
the bureaucratic process but also the leaders' own commitments to the
desired changes. It is a democratic rather than a dictatorial government
that assures stability in the legal process and that can bring about
developmental changes with wide and popular support of the societies for
whom the changes are instituted.
In pluralistic societies such as the Zambian, Malawian, Kenyan, Ni-
gerian, Tanzanian or Ghanian, the involvement of society itself, through
democratically elected representatives to government, is particularly nec-
essary as compromises between conflicting viewpoints are often called for.
Traditional and modern concepts of crime, marriage, succession or inher-
itance often conflict, making it imper ative that clear-cut laws be enacted
to govern the different spheres of action. The manner in which such
integration is accomplished will directly affect societal reception of the
law. Law should therefore have a unifying role by integrating the variety
of opinions without alienating the specific groups who have a minority
viewpoint. In many cases where laws are enacted to change societal
behaviour without consulting the communities the laws seek to govern,
the laws are either rejected outright or simply followed. The experience
of Soviet Central Asia is indicative of this point. There modern laws were
enacted to change rigid codes of behaviour of the Moslem communities.
There was no consultation with regard to those communities' reception
of the laws. The result was an outright rejection of the law.2 4
24. See Gregory, Law as an Instrument of Revolutionary Change in a Traditional Milieu, The
Case of Soviet Central Asia, 2 L. & Soc'y REv. 179 (1967).
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Thus, the true state of law in each society can only be understood by
examining how the law is functioning with reference to a number of
factors such as its legitimacy, the nature of its relationship to the political
process, the judicial reasoning process, the nature of executive functions
such as the exercise of delegatory or discretionary authority, the nature
of coercive elements and the degree of participation of society itself in
the promulgation and execution of laws in the society. It is fair to argue
that legal systems that are coercive, weakly bind rulers, strive to maintain
order and subordinate law to the political process, and expect uncondi-
tional societal obedience tend to be authoritarian and therefore repressive.
It is often argued that the single party states of Africa are of this character
and that law in such systems only serves to protect and promote the
interests of the ruling leadership. Theories posited by writers such as
Donald Black, William Chambliss, Richard Quinney and Robert Seidman
emphasize that the key to understanding the true nature of law in society
is to study it from an analysis of class position and class conflicts in
society. The writings of these authors should be critically studied by both
students and teachers of jurisprudence in African nations because the
conflict-based theories of law provide some insight into the nature of
particular laws in developing societies. Such contemporary study would
provide richer and more pertinent approaches to an understanding of law
than the early theories of jurists such as John Austin, H.L.A. Hart,
Friedrich Karl, von Savigny, Henry Maine and the other Western and
European philosophers whose works are routinely taught to students in
African law schools.
While these conflict-based theories study only a small aspect of laws
that are enacted as a direct result of power politics or class position in
society, they provide a useful and comparative data base from which the
more relevant and appropriate theories of law of functionalist nature
should be posited and understood in ascertaining the nature of law in
developing societies. Consequently, the consensus-based approaches to the
study of law postulated by writers such as Eugen Ehrlich, Karl Llewellyn,
A. Hoebel, Phillippe Nonet and Philip Selznick would provide a more
appropriate jurisprudential study for the understanding of law in the
developing societies of Africa. Law in these societies is a reflection of
perceived social needs to which all reasonable men agree in order for
society to keep on functioning as a group. Criminal laws are a reflection
on what is in the public interest and reflective of the moral indignation
of the majority in society. The inadequacy of the analytical positivist
theories of law that are indifferent to the justice or injustice of existing
conditions in a society makes them less appealing for developing societies
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wherein the state has to respond to the widely changing social, legal and
economic values and practices. Law has become a flexible instrument of
social ordering. Further, the additional burdens of providing society with
a wide range of amenities in modern welfare states has broadened the
scope of legislation. Hence, the resulting monopoly of state power is
prone to abuse, resulting in the leaders of African nations themselves
flouting the limits of the law. This makes it even more imperative that
laws should be constantly evaluated from a functional perspective with
the paramouncy of societal interests rather than the leaders' interests
prevailing. Rulers have to be subject to law just as the ruled are in order
to assure a government of laws and not of men.
It is sometimes argued that when socio-legal theorists speak of society's
interests, their values or their morality, they proceed on the assumption
that society is an entity in itself, a human being with expressed prefer-
ences."5 The argument asserts that it is very easy for such theorists
inadvertently to substitute their own values and evaluations for those of
society. While it is conceded that this is possible, it is also true of all
other disciplines or jurisprudential studies. One cannot evaluate anything
without starting from some sort of bias or another. This viewpoint
somewhat echoes legal realist thinking, which holds that in judicial rea-
soning it is not possible for judges completely to insulate their reasoning
from personal prejudices no matter how superhuman such judges set out
to be. In fact, it is better to start with a bias than with complete ignorance,
for biases increase scientific knowledge as the premises of inquiry are
open to all kinds of values. Even scientific studies of law start with a
priori assumptions. Law cannot and should not be studied without eval-
uative considerations; law is, in fact, part of the social sciences.
With these inherent and acquired biases, it is posited that the major
thematic concern of studying and teaching law in African nations should
be an empirical analysis of law that has the central goal of attaining legal
responsiveness and legal and social effectiveness. Gathered empirical ma-
terials should then be assessed against articulated standards such as
legality, rule of law or democracy. Such an approach infers a comparison
of legal reality to a legal ideal which is a utilitarian approach. A goal-
oriented legal development wherein law not only follows but leads social
sentiment calls for a scientific analysis of legal institutions. An analytical,
25. See, for example, the arguments of Donald Black, The Boundaries of Legal Sociology, 81
YALE L. J. 1086, 1090 (1972).
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descriptive and evaluative approach in the study of legal institutions will
enable an adequate and appropriate ascertainment as to whether law is
able to attain and has been attaining its intended objectives. The ends
that the law serves in society call for the evaluation of how best the ends
may be realised in the interests of the majority in society. It is therefore
not an analytical approach but a functional approach that is necessary in
both teaching and studying jurisprudence in African nations.
